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ABSTRACT 
 
Health and Safety Risks in Britain’s Workplaces: 
Where are They and Who Controls Them?* 
 
This is the first paper to identify the correlates of workplace managers’ perceptions of the 
health and safety risks faced by workers and the degree to which workers have control over 
those risks. The risks workers face and the control they have over those risks are weakly 
negatively correlated. Managerial risk ratings are positively associated with both injury and 
illness rates, but not with absence rates. The control rating is also positively associated with 
injury and illness rates, but it is negatively correlated with absence rates. Workers are more 
likely to be exposed to health and safety risks when their workplace is performing poorly and 
where it has been adversely affected by the recession. Union density is positively associated 
with risks but is not associated with worker control over risks. Having on-site worker 
representatives dealing with health and safety is linked to lower risks than direct consultation 
between management and employees over health and safety. However, there is no evidence 
that particular types of health and safety arrangement are related to worker control over 
health and safety risks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For over forty years the health and safety of workers in Britain has been underpinned by a 
tripartite system of rule making and enforcement. This system, which is based on the Health 
and Safety at Work Act 1974, is overseen by the Health and Safety Executive and its Board 
whose mission is "the prevention of death, injury and ill health to those at work and those 
affected by work activities" (DWP/HSE Framework Document).  The HSE Board and its 
predecessor the Health and Safety Commission, has a tripartite tradition, with appointments 
from the ranks of employers and trade unions, together with independent experts drawn from 
academia and industry.  These arrangements have proved flexible enough to accommodate 
substantial changes in the world of work in recent decades, not least the decline in trade union 
representation which was at its peak in the 1970s.  They are generally acknowledged to be a 
key contributory factor in Britain's good track record in terms of workplace injuries and 
accidents compared to other advanced industrialised nations.  However, the current 
arrangements for ensuring health and safety at work are not without their critics.  Some have 
even questioned the longer-term viability of existing arrangements and given dire warnings 
about the consequences of failing to grapple with the need for reform (Wadsworth and 
Walters, 2015).1 
 
Much of the academic literature has focused on the viability and effectiveness of worker 
inputs to workplace arrangements which, despite creating space for non-union forms of 
representation, tend to assume that workers will engage in health and safety issues through a 
trade union recognised by the employer as the bargaining agent for workers.  
 
The rights of workers to certain forms of health and safety representation vary depending 
upon the presence of a recognised trade union.  But clear evidence as to what might constitute 
the best set of arrangements to protect workers' health and safety remains elusive, in part 
because of technical difficulties in pinning down the causal effect of alternative arrangements 
                                                            
1 Nevertheless Wadsworth and Walters (2015: 15) cite evidence from the EU‐OSHA's Enterprise Survey on New 
and Emerging Risks (ESENER) that the UK "seems to score reasonably well" relative to other countries in terms 
of health and safety management and performance and that this is partly attributable to "the UK's long‐
standing tradition of process‐based health and safety regulation". 
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(Nichols et al., 2007). These technical difficulties are common to many scenarios when 
arrangements come into being in response to perceived problems or difficulties, as in the case 
of union representation.  In such circumstances it is hard to identify whether the arrangement 
is causally influencing health and safety outcomes, whether it arose in response to health and 
safety issues, or both.  These difficulties are problematic for policy makers because 
uncertainty regarding the efficacy of alternative arrangements makes it hard to advocate one 
course of action over another.  
 
One way to improve the state of knowledge regarding influences on health and safety at work 
is to exploit experimental variation in health and safety arrangements which may arise 
naturally or depend upon the design of a policy experiment, such as randomisation of 
alternative arrangements. Whilst this may appear to be impractical in many instances 
experimental designs are now common in other spheres of social research such as school 
education and labour market welfare programmes which are, like health and safety, "high 
stakes". 
 
In this paper we take a very different approach to the same issue by exploiting new questions, 
funded in part by the Health and Safety Executive, which were incorporated in to a large-scale 
national survey of workplaces in Britain called the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS). The survey was conducted between March 2011 and June 2012 at 2,680 workplaces 
with managers responsible for Human Resources at the workplace.  It is discussed in more 
detail in Section Three. WERS has always contained a wide array of items pertaining to 
health and safety, particularly in relation to arrangements for discussing and deciding on 
health and safety matters, who has responsibility for health and safety at the workplace, health 
and safety training and health and safety related outcomes such as work-based injury and 
illness and sickness absence.  WERS has provided the data for many of the academic 
contributions to the literature.2  But the new questions can provide new insights into 
occupational safety and health (OSH) because they ask HR Managers to directly assess "the 
                                                            
2 For a recent bibliography of WERS publications, including many on health and safety, go to: 
http://www.wers2011.info/publications/4587720043 
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potential health and safety risks faced by employees in this workplace" and "the control that 
employees have over health and safety risks that could affect them". These two issues - the 
risks workers face and the control they are able to exercise over those risks - are fundamental 
to understanding health and safety outcomes at work.  These outcomes are beyond the scope 
of the current paper - although we will briefly show the links between risk, control and 
injuries, illness and absence.  Instead the purpose of this paper is to identify what it is about 
the working environment which is linked to HR managers scoring their workplaces higher or 
lower on the "risk" scale and higher and lower on the "control" scale.  It is therefore 
distinctive in two ways.  First, it shifts attention away from health and safety outcomes like 
illness and injury towards factors that contribute to potential health and safety hazards. 
Second it ranges well beyond the arrangements for engaging employees in health and safety 
issues - what has been termed the "institutional focus on union representation" (Robinson and 
Smallman, 2013: 674) - to incorporate a vast array of workplace variables which might, 
conceivably affect the risks workers face and the control they may exert over those risks.  
Some of those variables are "structural" in the sense that they are "hard-wired" into certain 
professions or industries. As such, they may be more difficult (though not impossible) for 
employers or governments to rectify.  Others such as contractual arrangements, job design, 
the organisation of production and the deployment of human resource management (HRM) 
practices are more subject to employer choice and, as such, can be altered by employer and 
employee actions in such a way as to limit risk and improve control. 
 
The analysis of work-related health and safety risks and the degree to which employees have 
control of them is particularly pertinent from a policy perspective in the light of the 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 which set out what Wadsworth 
and Walters (2015: 9) describe as "broadly based obligations for employers to evaluate, avoid 
and reduce workplace risks" under the framework provided by the Health and Safety at Work 
Act.  The issue continues to pose challenges for employers and policy-makers alike since as 
Wadsworth and Walters (2015: 10) note one-sixth of workers surveyed in the 2010 European 
Working Conditions Survey thought their job risked their health and safety. 
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In the next section we introduce the measures of health and safety risks and control over those 
risks as perceived by Human Resource managers in the 2011 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey.  We present the distribution of these key measures, the correlation between 
the two, and their relationship with workplace injury, illness and absence rates.  Section Three 
describes the data and methods used to identify the correlates of risks and control. Results are 
presented in Section Four which is followed by a discussion and conclusions in Section Five.  
 
 
2. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS AND EMPLOYEE 
 CONTROL OVER THOSE RISKS 
 
There is a very substantial literature identifying the health and safety risks employees face at 
work. Risks are often assessed by employees in social surveys such as the European Working 
Conditions Survey which asks individuals to identify exposure to specific hazardous situations 
or substances. There are three potential drawbacks to such measures. First, difficulties 
interpreting these measures arise partly from employees' misperceptions of the risks they may 
actually face at work.  Individuals consistently underestimate the probability of accidents or 
illnesses happening at work.  This may be due to people using simple heuristic devices when 
making judgements, inbuilt resistance to unwelcome information, or irrational responses to 
messages about risk which are predicted in some psychological theories  (Pouliakas and 
Theodossiou, 2010: 6-7).  Second, by focusing on a specific set of circumstances or 
substances such measures may omit some risky situations, potentially underestimating the 
degree of risk that employees face.  Since OSH has traditionally focused on the prevention of 
occupational injuries and illnesses, as opposed to a broader focus on overall protection of 
workers' health and wellbeing, it seems likely that measures based on traditional measures of 
risk are more likely to understate risks associated with non-fatal risks. Third, the language of 
occupational risk prevention brings together the risks employees face and efforts at tackling 
exposure to that risk, making it difficult to distinguish between the underlying risks 
employees face and the degree to which employees are able to control those risks. 
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It was with these concerns in mind that new questions were added to the 2011 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey to establish both the risks employees faced at work and the 
control they had over those risks.  Managers are asked to "rate the potential health and safety 
risks faced by employees in the workplace" on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is "no risk at all" 
and 10 is "high degree of risk".  They are then immediately asked to "rate the control that 
employees have over the health and safety risks that could affect them", again on a 10-point 
scale where 1 is "no control at all" and 10 is "high degree of control".  The full survey 
questions, together with the format used to ask them in the interview, are presented in 
Appendix One. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of responses for all workplaces.  Only 19 respondents were 
unable to provide a risk rating and 12 were unable to provide a control rating. The responses 
are survey weighted such that they relate to the distribution for the population of workplaces 
in Britain with at least 5 employees.  The figures above the bars represent the percentage of 
workplaces in that part of the distribution.  One-in-ten (11%) of managers thought their 
workers faced "no risk at all", while more than half (54%) rated risk at 2 or 3 on the 10 point 
scale.  At the other end of the scale, another one-in-ten (11%) rated risk at 7 or above.  
Turning to the control rating, one-quarter (26%) of managers gave a score of 10, the highest 
level of employee control over health and safety risks, with a further quarter (27%) giving a 
score of 9.  Very few - 7 per cent - rated control below a score of 6. 
 
The questions are asked of the manager responsible for human resources at the workplace. It 
is not clear, a priori, whether managers in a position of authority will have better information 
about the risks specific individuals face and the control they have over health and safety risks 
compared with those individual employees. However, they are likely to possess better 
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information than any individual employee when characterising OSH risks and their control 
across the whole workplace.3 
 
It is uncertain, a priori, what the association might be between health and safety risks 
employees face and the control they have over those risks.  On the one hand employers may 
be keen to share responsibility for controlling risks at the workplace, especially when those 
risks are substantial.  This might imply a positive correlation between risk and control ratings, 
something which might seem appropriate if an employer thought that providing employees 
with such control might mitigate the risks employees faced.  On the other hand, in work 
environments posing high risks employers may choose to "take control" of that risk directly, 
for example through redesigning jobs or work processes, thus removing this responsibility 
from employees directly.  If this happens then risk and control ratings may be negatively 
correlated. In fact, the correlation coefficient is negative and statistically significant, though 
not particularly large (-0.0809).4  If one regresses the control rating on the risk rating having 
accounted for the complex survey design the coefficient on control is -.098 and is statistically 
significant at a 95% confidence interval (t-statistic 2.05).  Regressing the risk rating on the 
control rating the coefficient on risk is -.067 and is statistically significant at a 90% 
confidence interval (t-statistic 1.91). 
 
One can split workplaces into those with high risk ratings and high control ratings where high 
is indicated by having a score above the median for the whole sample.  If so workplaces with 
a risk rating above 3 score "high", as do those with control ratings above 8. One can then 
characterise workplaces according to whether they score high or low on each binary variable. 
If one does so then three-in-ten (29%) of workplaces are Low Risk, Low Control, over one-
third (37%) are Low Risk, High Control; one-sixth (17%) are High Risk, Low Control and a 
further one-sixth (17%) are High Risk, High Control. 
                                                            
3 It is also unclear as to whether the way in which HR managers weigh the information available to them will 
differ from other employees. 
4 In the WERS First Findings Van Wanrooy et al. (2013: 39) state: "there was no relationship between managers' 
rating of health and safety risks and their rating of employees' control of those risks". This is not the case in the 
final data set. There may be a number of reasons for this, including alterations made to sampling weights 
during the finalisation of the data. 
8 
 
 
Although measures of work-related risk factors which focus on specific circumstances or 
exposure to particularly hazardous situations or substances may under-record risk, it is 
nevertheless the case that they are strongly correlated with health and safety outcomes such as 
the incidence of work accidents and the occurrence of occupational diseases (Pouliakas and 
Theodossiou, 2010: 9).  One way to validate the risk and control scales in WERS is to 
ascertain whether they are correlated with health and safety outcomes. The results are 
presented in the correlation matrix in Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE ONE] 
 
The table contains three health and safety outcomes, namely the absence rate (percentage of 
work days lost through employee sickness or absence in the last 12 months), the injury rate 
(number of injuries during working hours per 100 employees in the last 12 months) and the 
illness rate (number of employees per 100 employees who, in the last 12 months, suffered 
illness, disability or physical problems caused or made worse by their work and who were 
absent as a result).  The risk rating is positively associated with both injury and illness rates, 
but not with absence rates. The control rating is also positively associated with injury and 
illness rates, but it is negatively correlated with absence rates suggesting that, if employee 
control over health and safety risks mitigates the adverse effects of risk, this is most apparent 
in terms of how employees respond to illness and injury in terms of absence taking.5   
 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
Having briefly introduced managerial ratings for the health and safety risks facing employees 
and the degree to which they have control over those risks we describe the data and methods 
used to conduct multivariate analysis of the workplace correlates of risk and control. 
 
                                                            
5 These associations are worthy of further investigation but they fall beyond the scope of the current project. 
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The descriptive analyses in Section Two have two implications for the way in which we 
model risk and control ratings.  First, the distribution of responses on both questions are far 
from normally distributed and it is therefore likely that the error terms in any linear model 
estimating these variables as outcomes are not going to be normally distributed.  We 
nevertheless run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models which assume a normal distribution in 
the error terms, but we do so having logged the risk and control variables referred to above.  
(The distribution of the logged dependent variables are presented in the kernel density graphs 
in Appendix Two alongside the distributions for the non-logged equivalents). We also run 
survey weighted estimates which permit extrapolation of results to the whole population of 
workplaces from which WERS is drawn, namely those with 5 or more employees.  In doing 
so we deploy a robust estimator that takes account of the heteroskedastic pattern in the error 
terms.   
 
Second, there is a negative, albeit fairly weak, correlation between risk and control ratings.  It 
is conceivable that this arises because risk and control are, at least to some degree, 
simultaneously determined. We run some sensitivity tests which account for unobserved 
correlations between the risk and control ratings but the results do not change very much so 
we focus on standard OLS estimates.6 
 
Our data are the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). Appropriately 
weighted, it is a nationally representative survey of workplaces in Britain with 5 or more 
employees covering all sectors of the economy except agriculture and mining (van Wanrooy 
et al., 2013b).7 Our analysis uses one element of the survey, namely the face-to-face interview 
with the most senior workplace manager responsible for employee relations.8 Interviews were 
conducted in 2,680 workplaces between March 2011 and June 2012 with a response rate of 
46%.   
                                                            
6 They confirm the negative correlation in the error terms between these two equations. Results from these 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) are available from the author on request.  
7 Some sectors, notably agriculture and fisheries and mining are excluded from the survey. 
8 Surveys are also conducted with employees and worker representatives but analysis of these surveys lies 
outside the scope of this study. For more information on WERS go to http://www.wers2011.info/ 
10 
 
 
Our multivariate analyses condition on five sorts of control variables which are entered 
simultaneously into the models for risk and control ratings. (Basic descriptive information for 
all independent variables is presented in Appendix Table 3). The precise configuration of 
variables used in the models presented in Section Four is the product of considerable 
experimentation. Some variables which one might expect to see in the analysis are dropped 
after exploratory analyses indicating that they have no significant relationship with risk and 
control ratings. However, most of these variables, and others which were considered, were 
statistically non-significant or were not robust to various model specifications.  We discuss 
some variables that do not appear in our final models where they are viewed as either 
theoretically important or have been identified as potentially significant in earlier studies. 
 
The first set of variables that we use in our models are "hard-wired" into the workplace, in the 
sense that although they are, conceivably, subject to alteration via managerial decision-
making, they can nevertheless be treated as pre-determined or "structural".  These variables 
are: 
 the number of employees at the workplace 
 public sector organisation 
 region (11 dummies) 
 industry (1-digit, 2-digit and 5-digit classifications) 
 occupational mix (the largest non-managerial occupational group) 
 workforce composition (percent female). 
 
We experimented with different models according to the degree to which we control for 
detailed industrial classification. As is well-known from the literature, much of the variance in 
the job-related risks that employees face are a direct result of the type of job they do and the 
industry they work in.  It is therefore important to account for that variance adequately.  
Failure to do so can induce omitted variables bias wherein some correlations between other 
variables of interest, such as management practices, may, in fact, simply reflect industry 
variance in the incidence of those practices.  One has to be cautious, however, when 
11 
 
controlling for very detailed industry classification given that the total number of workplaces 
in our estimation sample is around 2,580.  Nevertheless, it is very striking how much of the 
variance in risk and control ratings is linked to the industry to which the workplace belongs, 
as indicated in Table 2.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
Running models that control for industry classification alone nine per cent of the variance in 
risk ratings across workplaces can be accounted for by single digit industry.  This rises to 16% 
when switching to a two-digit classification and 41% with a five-digit classification. A similar 
pattern emerges with respect to control ratings, although in all models the variance explained 
is lower for control ratings than it is for risk ratings, rising from 2% with single digit industry 
to 21% with 5-digit industry. In the analyses presented in Section Four we focus on models 
incorporating two digit industry. In doing so we are essentially exploring variance in risk and 
control ratings within two-digit industry. 
 
The second set of variables identify who the managerial respondent is.  These variables, 
interesting in their own right since they identify which sorts of HR managers give higher and 
lower risk and control ratings, are primarily included to soak up "noise" in our estimates 
associated with systematically different perceptions of different types of manager and 
differences associated with their competence to judge on such matters, as well as how well 
informed they might be about health and safety matters.  These variables are: 
 whether the manager is female 
 whether the manager, or someone who is responsible to the manager, has formal 
responsibility for health and safety matters at the workplace 
 the manager's formal job title (4 dummy variables). 
 
The third set of variables used in our analyses relate to the market for goods or services in 
which the workplace operates.  This is partly captured, of course, by industry classification, 
but WERS contains a plethora of information about the configuration of the market for goods 
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and services - the location of the market, the number of competitors the workplace faces, the 
workplace's market share - and changes in market conditions, all of which may have a bearing 
on health and safety risks and control.  The market variables we focus on in our analyses are: 
 the extent to which the manager agrees the workplace is "now weaker as a result of its 
experience of the recent recession" (a five point Likert scale entered as a linear term) 
 an additive scale for the performance of the workplace relative to the industry 
average.9  
 
The fourth group of variables used in these analyses are policies, practices or procedures over 
which managers, either at workplace-level or elsewhere in multi-site organisations, exercise 
considerable discretion.  As such they are more akin to "choice" variables than those 
discussed above.  The fact that they are "choice" variables means it is not possible to make 
causal inferences about their impact on risk and control ratings using cross-sectional data.  
This is because managers' choices as to the practices and procedures they deploy may be 
simultaneously determined with the risks and control employees face at the workplace.  They 
may even be a response to the health and safety situation leading to reverse causality.  
Managers will be aware, at least imperfectly, of the costs and benefits of deploying certain 
policies and practices, including those relating to health and safety costs and benefits.  It is 
likely, therefore, that those policies and practices may be endogenous with respect to our 
outcomes of interest making causal inferences problematic.10   
                                                            
9 This additive scale, which runs from 0 to 9, where 0 is the poorest performance and 9 the highest, combines 
responses from three items asking the manager "Compared with other workplaces in the same industry how 
would you assess your workplace's....financial performance, labour productivity, quality of product or service?" 
The responses identify whether the workplace is "a lot better than average", "better than average", "about 
average", "below average" and "a lot below average".  In summing the items we combine the small number of 
observations that are below or a lot below average. 
10 Causal inferences can be made when practices are randomly assigned either across or within workplaces, but 
this is rarely done in the case of health and safety matters. There may also be opportunities to exploit 
exogenous variation in policies and practices arising from natural experiments such as those relating to changes 
in government policy.  In the absence of such sources of exogenous variance analysts often deploy instrumental 
variables techniques.  Examples using WERS data include Fenn and Ashby (2004) and Robinson and Smallman 
(2006).  However, the identification assumptions are often subject to criticism due to the use of weak 
instruments or the difficulties faced in credibly maintaining that the instruments can reasonably be excluded 
from the outcome equation (the exclusion restriction). It would be possible for us to identify the antecedents 
to control and risk ratings in 2011 using predictors from the 2004 WERS for panel cases, but this is beyond the 
scope of the current study. 
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With these caveats in mind we distinguish between policies, practices and procedures falling 
within four domains.  The first domain relates to the organisation of production at the 
workplace and is characterised using the following variables: 
 a dummy variable capturing the presence of fully autonomous team working11 
 the percentage of core non-managerial employees organised into teams 
 functional flexibility on the part of core non-managerial employees, as indicated by 
actually doing jobs other than their own at least once a week 
 the number of financial incentive schemes at the workplace12 
 an additive job autonomy scale. 13 
 
The second domain is the contractual arrangements the workplace uses for its workers.  We 
investigated the role of annual hours contracts, zero hours contracts, temporary agency 
workers, freelancers, home-working, fixed-term contracts, part-time working,  and shift-work, 
as well as an additive scale for non-standard contracts (summing all these contracts except 
part-time working which is widespread).  Our final models retain a simple dummy variable 
identifying shift-working. 
 
The third domain is what might be loosely termed "human resource management (HRM) 
practices".  Again, WERS contains a very broad array of such practices, many of which were 
incorporated in our models but were either statistically non-significant or were not robust to 
                                                            
11 These are workplaces where core non‐managerial employees operate in teams where "team members 
depend on each other's work to be able to do their job", "team members jointly decide how the work is to be 
done", and "teams are given responsibility for specific products or services". 
12 The additive scale is based on the number of the following schemes used: merit pay; individual payment‐by‐
results; team‐based payment‐by‐results; workplace‐based payment‐by‐results; organization‐level payment‐by‐
results; share ownership scheme; profit‐related pay scheme. 
13 The additive scale runs from 0 to 12 scoring workplaces according to the degree to which core non‐
managerial employees have "variety in their work", "discretion over how they do their work"; "control over the 
pace at which they work"; and "involvement in decision over how their work is organised".  The subscales run 
from "None" (zero) to "a lot" (three). 
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alternative model specifications.14 The final set of HRM practices used in our models relate 
directly or indirectly to health and safety issues. They are: 
 The workplace has targets for absenteeism 
 The workplace has targets for employee job satisfaction 
 Core non-managerial employees have health and safety training 
 Whether managerial and non-managerial employees have sick pay entitlements "in 
excess of statutory requirements". 
 
The fourth domain, which has perhaps been the most widely explored in the literature to date, 
is the arrangements for worker representation via trade unions and other mechanisms.  Here 
we focus on three sets of variables: 
 the percentage of employees at the workplace belonging to a trade union 
 whether there is a trade union at the workplace and, if so, whether the employer 
informs, consults or negotiates with the union over health and safety matters, or does 
nothing 
 the arrangements for engaging employees over health and safety matters, 
distinguishing between direct consultation, use of a joint committee, use of worker 
representatives, or doing nothing. 
 
These three items overlap in such a way that they cannot be entered together in the same 
equation. Instead we experiment with different combinations. 
 
The fifth and final group of variables used in our analyses are managerial attitudes to aspects 
of management.  We use three 5-point scales capturing the degree to which the manager 
agrees with the following statements: 
 "Unions help find ways to improve workplace performance" 
 "We would rather consult directly with employees than with unions" 
                                                            
14 These included training a high percentage of core employees off‐the‐job; quality circles; Investors in People 
award; use of appraisals; strategic planning; benchmarking; keeping of records; eligibility for flexible 
arrangements for time off work.  
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 "We do not introduce any changes here without first discussing the implications with 
employees" 
 
In capturing part of managerial style and orientation they are interesting in their own right, but 
they might also capture some of what lies behind managers' choices in terms of health and 
safety arrangements. These attitudes are incorporated as a sensitivity check when exploring 
the association between risk and control ratings and worker representation and health and 
safety arrangements. 
 
We use dummy variables to capture instances in which workplaces have missing data on 
particular items, thus limiting the loss of observations due to missing data. Our final 
estimation sample is between 2,579 and 2,584 depending on the model. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Our baseline results are presented in Table 3.  The model specifications are identical for the 
two dependent variables log risk rating and log control rating. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
Perceptions of health and safety risks and employee control of those risks differ with the 
characteristics of managerial respondents. Finance Managers and, to a lesser extent, Owner 
Managers and General Managers, give lower risk ratings than their professional HR Manager 
counterparts whose expertise is signalled by their job title.15 Perceptions of control do not 
differ according to the manager's job title.  Those who are directly responsible for health and 
safety matters at the workplace perceive employee control of health and safety risks to be a 
little greater than those who do not have direct responsibility.  Managers' gender also matters: 
                                                            
15 HR specialists are indicated with job titles such as "Human Resource Manager" or "Manager of Employment 
Relations". 
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ceteris paribus female HR managers think employees face greater risks and have less control 
over those risks than their male counterparts. 
 
There is a substantial literature pointing to the importance of firm size and, in particular, the 
distinction between small, medium-sized and large organisations, in determining job-related 
risks, health and safety outcomes and worker wellbeing.  For example, using the 2004 WERS 
Forth et al. (2006) find job satisfaction differs by firm size. Reviewing the literature Pouliakas 
and Theodossiou (2010: 15) suggest health and safety risks are greatest in medium-sized 
companies.  The hypothesis underpinning a number of studies is that larger organisations are 
better able to devote resources to controlling health and safety risks, either through 
supervision, training and support or thorough risk assessments, than smaller organisations. 
However, variables capturing organizational size, such as whether the workplace belonged to 
a larger organization, firm size, and the number of establishments owned by the organisation, 
were not statistically significant.  We retained the number of employees at the workplace in 
the model but this is also statistically non-significant (as was a squared term which has been 
removed).   
 
However, two other "structural" features of the workplace were statistically significant having 
accounted for industry affiliation. Public sector employees faced lower risks than their private 
sector counterparts, but they were also thought to have less control over those risks.16  The 
location of the workplace also mattered: the regional dummies are jointly statistically 
significant in both the risk and control models.17 However, it is difficult to find a rationale for 
the pattern of regional effects.  Workplaces in the North East, the East of England, and the 
West Midlands appear to have the lowest risk ratings whilst the East Midlands and the South 
East (which is the reference category) have the highest.  Differences are less pronounced with 
                                                            
16 This finding is worthy of further examination given the strong correlations between industrial sector, worker 
representation and public sector. For instance, split analyses for the public and private sectors may be 
informative. 
17 We use Wald tests to establish whether sets of variables are jointly significant (the testparm command in 
STATA). 
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regard control ratings: workplaces in the North East have the highest control ratings while 
Wales and Scotland have the lowest. 
 
Since different occupations carry different levels of risk (Smallman, 2001) it is hardly 
surprising to find that the occupational mix at the workplace is strongly linked to managers' 
risk ratings.  The single-digit occupational classification for the largest non-managerial 
occupational group is jointly statistically significant in the risk ratings model.  Workplaces 
where the largest occupation is Skilled Trades or Process, Plant or Machine Operatives had 
significantly higher risk ratings than those whose largest occupational group was 
Professionals (the reference category). However, the occupational composition of the 
workplace is not significantly associated with control ratings.18   
 
If individuals with relatively poor human capital or low bargaining power find it necessary to 
take up jobs that others prefer to avoid one might expect an association between proxies for 
poor human capital and low bargaining power to be positively associated with risk ratings and 
negatively correlated with control ratings. Proxies might include the percentage of ethnic 
minority employees, the percentage of migrants (distinguishing those from the European 
Economic Area and those from elsewhere), and the percentage disabled.  However, none of 
these were robustly associated with risk and control ratings.  
 
The percentage of females in the workforce, on the other hand, was negatively associated with 
risk ratings, though it was not related to control ratings.  One might have expected a negative 
association between the percentage of females at the workplace and risk ratings given gender 
differences in the occupations and tasks men and women tend to perform, but the finding 
persists even though the models contain fairly detailed controls for the nature of the work 
being undertaken at the workplace. It is possible that the percentage female is picking up 
differences in human capital or bargaining power not otherwise accounted for by the model. 
Alternatively, women may sort into less risky jobs, as might be predicted by the literature 
indicating that women are more risk-averse than men (Grazier and Sloane, 2008). 
                                                            
18 Similar findings emerge if we use the percentage of employees in each occupational classification. 
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There are a number of reasons why one might anticipate a link between health and safety risk 
and control ratings and workplace performance.  For example, workplaces performing poorly 
relative to others in their industry, or as a result of the recent recession, may face greater 
difficulties in devoting the time and resource needed in ensuring health and safety matters are 
adequately addressed at the workplace.  Table 3 confirms that the additive performance scale 
is negatively associated with risk ratings, whereas the perception that the workplace was 
weakened by the recession is positively associated with risk ratings.  However, workplace 
performance is not associated with employee control over those risks.  
 
Next we turn to the policy and practice domains over which employers have a reasonable 
degree of choice.  We begin with the five items capturing managerial discretion over the way 
work is organised and rewarded.  These prove more important in explaining variance in 
employee control over health and safety risks than they do in accounting for variance in risk 
ratings.  Taken together these five practices (the extent of team-working, the degree of 
autonomy teams had, job autonomy, functional flexibility and the incidence of financial 
incentives) are jointly highly statistically significant in the control ratings models but are only 
on the margins of statistical significance (at a 90% confidence level) in the risk ratings 
models. 
 
Neither the extent to which employees are working in teams nor the autonomy those teams 
have are significantly associated with the degree of risk employees face.  But both are linked 
to control of those risks, albeit in different ways.  Control ratings rise with the percentage of 
employees working in teams, but fall with the degree to which those teams are fully 
autonomous of the managerial hierarchy.19 This second finding is consistent with Robinson 
and Smallman's (2006: 99) conjecture that "a situation in which too much freedom and a lack 
of clear guidelines or procedures about how work is to be done may be counterproductive". 
An alternative conjecture is that the degree to which teams operate autonomously is an 
                                                            
19 This may partly explain Robinson and Smallman's (2006: 98) finding that, at least in manufacturing, 
autonomous team working is associated with higher injury rates when compared to semi‐autonomous team 
working. 
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indicator of the degree to which team-working entails labour intensification, as opposed to a 
means of job enrichment as it is often characterised in the HRM literature (Wood and Bryson, 
2009).2021 
 
Worker autonomy at the job-level - as indicated by an additive scale capturing the degree to 
which core non-managerial employees have variety in their work, discretion over how they do 
their work, control over the pace at which they work and involvement in decision over how 
their work is organised - is positively associated with control ratings but is not associated with 
risk ratings.22 
 
By linking pay to performance, either at individual, group or organisation level, incentive pay 
systems are often identified as mechanisms encouraging employees to work harder than they 
might otherwise have done under a fixed pay contract where employees are paid for the time 
they work.  They therefore have the potential to increase health and safety risks where 
workers increase the pace at which they are working.  The desire to raise output under 
performance pay contracts may also encourage workers to limit the time they spend "off-line" 
in training, or in servicing equipment, potentially increasing risk and reducing employee 
control over health and safety risks. In fact the number of incentive schemes used at the 
workplace was negatively associated with risk ratings and was not significant in the control 
ratings models. 
 
                                                            
20 In earlier versions of the model we incorporated a dummy variable capturing just‐in‐time production. This 
was not associated with risk ratings, but it was negatively associated with control ratings. However, the finding 
was not robust to alternative model specifications. 
21 The literature on sickness absence focuses on the degree to which workers are complements or substitutes 
for one another.  It generally finds absence taking is lower where workers are complements, especially when 
combined with team incentives, because the absence of a small number of workers can substantially reduce 
team output. 
22 Analyses of the 1998 WERS suggest that the association between job autonomy and injuries and illnesses is a 
little more complex. Control over the pace of work is associated with lower injury and illness rates in both 
manufacturing and services. Having a lot of variety in one's work is positively associated with illness in services 
but negatively associated with injury in manufacturing. Discretion over how one performs one's job tasks is 
strongly positively associated with illnesses in the manufacturing sector (Robinson and Smallman, 2006: 97‐99).  
These complex relationships suggest more investigation of job autonomy and its components might be 
merited. 
20 
 
The only work organisation practice significantly associated with both risk and control ratings 
was functional flexibility on the part of core non-managerial employees as indicated by 
actually doing jobs other than their own at least once a week. This practice, often advocated 
by HRM practitioners as a means of increasing work efficiency and minimising costs, is 
significantly associated with higher risk ratings and lower control ratings. 
 
Manager-initiated work reorganisation adversely affects employees' subjective wellbeing 
(Bryson et al., 2013).  It is also possible that such workplace innovations could disrupt 
procedures, policies and ways of doing things in a way that creates new health and safety 
risks, or reduces employee control over those risks. We therefore tested the association 
between managerial innovations over the previous two years and risk and control ratings.  
There was no association so these variables are omitted from the model.23 
 
Employers also exercise choice over work organisation by deciding what sorts of employment 
contracts they will offer to their staff, and the extent to which they resort to flexible forms of 
labour to complement their core staff.  We investigated the role of annual hours contracts, 
zero hours contracts, temporary agency workers, freelancers, home-working, fixed-term 
contracts, part-time working,  and shift-work, as well as an additive scale for non-standard 
contracts (summing all these contracts except part-time working which is widespread).  The 
value of contingent contracts from an employer perspective is that they offer greater 
flexibility over hiring and firing decisions, and enable employers to bring in staff for short 
periods to perform discrete tasks, or to meet fluctuations in demand for goods or services, 
without incurring the costs that labour adjustments may entail when dealing with permanent 
employees. From a health and safety perspective, however, they may increase the complexity 
of work organisation as permanent staff seek to coordinate and work alongside those in non-
standard contracts.  Workers on such contracts may be less familiar with working practices at 
                                                            
23 The survey items are based on the question: "Over the last two years has management here introduced any 
of the changes listed on this card....Introduction of performance related pay; Introduction or upgrading of new 
technology (including computers); changes in working time arrangements; changes in the organisation of work; 
changes in work techniques or procedures; introduction of initiatives to involve employees; introduction of 
technologically new or significantly improved products or services". 
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a particular workplace, and employers may be less inclined to train them and explain health 
and safety procedures to them.  For these reasons one might anticipate that they are linked to 
higher risk ratings and lower control ratings.  In general this proved not to be the case so 
variables capturing these contingent contracts are excluded from the model.  The only 
exception is shift-working, a form of contract which is often offered to permanent staff.  Shift-
working is associated with employees facing higher health and safety risk, but it is not 
associated with control ratings.  The result is unsurprising given the association between 
increased injury probabilities and shift-working found in other studies (Robinson and 
Smallman, 2006: 98).24   
 
There is renewed interest in the potential value of target setting, performance monitoring via 
record systems, and incentive structures following the work of Bloom et al. (2014) indicating 
an association between management practices (sometimes loosely termed "HRM practices") 
and firm productivity.  Their relationship to workplace health and safety has not been 
examined so systematically. We investigated a wide range of potential indicators to establish 
what correlation, if any, they had with risk and control ratings.  Many were not associated 
with either outcome.25 The subset of five practices retained in Table 3 are jointly statistically 
significant in both models.  In general, setting targets was not significantly associated with 
risk and control ratings, but there were two exceptions.  Targets for absence were negatively 
associated with employees having control over the health and safety risks they faced, as might 
be expected if employers wishing to pro-actively manage the risks employees faced chose to 
do so through top-down management practices.  Targets for employee satisfaction, on the 
other hand, are positively associated with control ratings.  The literature indicates that 
employee satisfaction rises with job control (Bryson et al., 2014) so it is perhaps unsurprising 
to find that employers targeting employee job satisfaction are prepared to cede control over 
                                                            
24 Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2010: 14) review the literature indicating that a variety of working time 
arrangements adversely affect workers' physical and psychological health through a range of mechanisms such 
as exhaustion and interruption to sleep patterns. 
25 These included benchmarking against other workplaces ("examining the ways things are done at other 
workplaces and comparing them with this workplace"); award of Investors in People; strategic planning; quality 
circles; the extensive use of off‐the‐job training; and the maintenance of records in relation to matters such as 
sales, costs, profits, productivity, quality of output, labour turnover, absenteeism, and workforce training. 
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health and safety risks to their employees. Neither target was significantly correlated with risk 
ratings. 
 
Health and safety risk ratings are higher in workplaces reporting that core non-managerial 
employees are given health and safety training.  In a similar vein Robinson and Smallman 
(2006: 98) find OSH training is positively correlated with injuries and illnesses in the service 
sector.  Both sets of findings do not necessarily indicate training is ineffective in tackling 
risks.  It is equally plausible that employers only offer training in circumstances where they 
perceive the risks to be higher, that is, the training measure is endogenous with respect to risk.  
Nevertheless it is informative to note that OSH training is not associated with greater 
employee control over risks, as one might have expected in training provided employees with 
means to take control over the risks they face. 
 
Whether employers choose a sick pay scheme offering employees entitlements above the 
statutory minima is potentially informative about employers' preparedness to compensate 
employees for the risks they face at work.  If viewed as a fringe benefit for employees running 
higher health and safety risks, it might be positively correlated with risk ratings, just as one 
might anticipate a positive correlation between wages and risk if higher wages were operating 
as a compensating wage differential.26  If payment of sick pay above the statutory minima is 
an indicator of an "enlightened" employer concerned with employee welfare this might be 
positively correlated with the employer's propensity to cede control over health and safety 
risks to employees. Neither conjecture is supported in the models: sick pay arrangements are 
not significantly correlated with control or risk ratings. 
 
Our final set of variables in the model are those capturing worker representation at the 
workplace on health and safety matters and more generally.  The literature referred to earlier 
focuses largely on the relationship between worker representation and injury and illness rates.  
                                                            
26 For a review of the literature on poor working conditions, health and safety risks and compensating 
differentials see Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2010). We entered the percentage of employees in different wage 
bands into our regressions but the wage distribution was not statistically significant in either the risk or control 
models. 
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The analysis here is different in that it focuses on managerial perceptions of health and safety 
risks and employee control over those risks.  Consequently, our analyses do not have to 
contend with the difficulty in interpreting associations when workers with stronger forms of 
representation are more likely to report a given accident, injury or occupational illness.   
 
It is well-established that worker demand for union representation rises with the problems 
employees face at work (Bryson and Freeman, 2013).  This is likely to mean that union 
presence and the strength of a given union, as indicated by the percentage joining the union 
(union density) will be endogenous in models estimating risk ratings. One might therefore 
expect them to be positively correlated. Some earlier studies have sought to tackle the 
endogeneity of union status using instrumental variables.  This has not been attempted in the 
current draft of the paper. 
 
One might anticipate a positive correlation between unionisation and control ratings if worker 
representatives are successful in mitigating risks by bargaining in favour of more employee 
control over risks.  
 
As in earlier papers we distinguish between union incidence and the nature of worker 
representation in health and safety matters.  The latter are captured by the formal nature of 
health and safety arrangements but also, in alternative models, by the nature of union 
involvement in health and safety - specifically whether the employer negotiates with the union 
over health and safety matters, consults the union, simply informs the union or does nothing at 
all.   
 
In investigating the association between worker representation and risk and control ratings we 
check the sensitivity of results to the inclusion of the three managerial style variables 
discussed in the last section which identify the manager's attitudes towards dealing with 
unions versus dealing directly with employees. 
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As anticipated, there is a positive statistical association between union density and risk ratings 
suggesting, perhaps, that worker demand for union representation rises with health and safety 
risk.  However, union density is uncorrelated with control ratings.  This is the case whether or 
not one controls for the level of risk at the workplace and regardless of whether one controls 
for managerial attitudes.27  If one treats union density as a proxy for union bargaining power 
the implication is that it has little bearing on employees' ability to control the health and safety 
risks they face at work. 
 
Conditioning on union density, Table 3 shows arrangements for worker representation on 
health and safety matters makes little difference to control ratings but, relative to the reference 
category of direct consultation between management and employees, having worker 
representatives is associated with lower risk ratings.  There is no difference in risk ratings in 
workplaces with joint committees relative to those with direct consultation. 
 
Some observers argue that the rights to worker representation on health and safety matters are 
weaker in non-unionised workplaces in spite of legislative changes in the 1990s (Robinson 
and Smallman, 2006: 88).  We therefore split the sample according to whether the workplace 
had a recognised trade union.  Links between representation and risk and control ratings did 
not differ significantly in the two sectors.   
 
In the union sector we are also able to distinguish between scenarios in which the employer 
negotiates, consults, informs or does not engage with a union over health and safety.  
However, these variables were not jointly statistically significant in either the risk or control 
models. 
  
                                                            
27 When introduced into the control rating model reported in Table 3 log(risk) is negative and statistically 
significant (‐.07, t‐stat=2.92) but the coefficients on union density are essentially unchanged.  When introduced 
into the control rating model reported in Table 3 the three employer attitudes variables are jointly statistically 
non‐significant and have no bearing on union density. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
To our knowledge this is the first analysis of managerial ratings of health and safety risks and 
their workplace and employee control over those risks.  We are able to do so because new 
questions, sponsored by the Health and Safety Executive, were inserted into the 2011 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey.  Appropriately weighted, this is a nationally 
representative survey of all workplaces in Britain with at least 5 employees.  Although earlier 
versions of the survey have been used extensively to explore the correlates of workplace 
injuries and illnesses, the prime focus of this literature has been the arrangements for worker 
representation in health and safety matters.  This started to change a few years ago, with 
growing interest in non-union forms of information, communication and consultation.  This 
paper takes this broader focus a step further by investigating the associations between an array 
of workplace practices and policies that may impinge upon the risks workers face in the 
workplace and their ability to control those risks.    
 
This is the first paper to identify the correlates of workplace managers' perceptions of the 
health and safety risks faced by workers and the degree to which workers have control over 
those risks.  The risks workers face and the control they have over those risks are weakly 
negatively correlated. Managerial risk ratings are positively associated with both injury and 
illness rates, but not with absence rates. Control ratings are also positively associated with 
injury and illness rates, but they are negatively correlated with absence rates. Workers are 
more likely to be exposed to health and safety risks when their workplace is performing 
poorly and where it has been adversely affected by the recession. Union density is positively 
associated with risks but is not associated with worker control over risks. Having on-site 
worker representatives dealing with health and safety is linked to lower risks than direct 
consultation between management and employees over health and safety. However, there is 
no evidence that particular types of health and safety arrangement are related to worker 
control over health and safety risks. 
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Figure 1: Risk and Control Ratings
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix for Risk, Control, Absence, Injury and Illness 
 
 
             |   Risk    Cont  Absence  Injury  Illness 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
      Risk   |   1.0000  
             | 
             |     2661 
             | 
      Control|  -0.0809   1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
             |     2659     2668 
             | 
     Absence |   0.0058  -0.0910   1.0000  
             |   0.7816   0.0000 
             |     2270     2275     2283 
             | 
     Injury  |   0.1021   0.0342  -0.0419   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0775   0.0452 
             |     2661     2668     2283     2680 
             | 
    Illness  |   0.0836   0.0401   0.1388   0.1915   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0382   0.0000   0.0000 
             |     2661     2668     2283     2680     2680 
             | 
Note: numbers are bivariate correlation coefficients from survey weighted data. Underneath 
each coefficient is the p-value and the unweighted number of workplaces on which the 
correlation is based.  Statistically significant p-values are in bold. 
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Table 2: The Variance in Log Risk and Log Control Ratings Accounted for by Industry 
Alone 
 
 1-digit SIC 2-digit SIC 3-digit SIC 
 Risk Control Risk Control Risk Control 
r-squared .093 .021 .162 .030 .410 .215 
Unwted N 2661 2668 2661 2668 2661 2668 
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Table 3: Log Risk and Control Models       
  Risk    Control   
Respondent characteristics:         
Female  0.08 **  ‐0.04 * 
  (2.03)    (‐1.85)   
H&S responsibilities  0.05   0.05 * 
  (1.19)    (1.94)   
Job Title (ref.: HR Manager)         
Owner/general manager  ‐0.08   ‐0.03  
  (‐1.64)    (‐1.08)   
Finance Manager  ‐0.3 ***  0.03  
  (‐4.70)    (0.80)   
Other  0.23 **  ‐0.05  
  (2.21)    (‐0.74)   
Workplace characteristics:         
Region (ref: South East)         
Yorkshire and Humberside  ‐0.03   ‐0.02  
  (‐0.34)    (‐0.33)   
North West  ‐0.16 **  ‐0.01  
  (‐2.13)    (‐0.20)   
North East  ‐0.2 **  0.08 ** 
  (‐2.15)    (2.25)   
East of England  ‐0.2 ***  0.02  
  (‐2.68)    (0.54)   
East Midlands  0.05   ‐0.01  
  (0.57)    (‐0.31)   
West Midlands  ‐0.18 ***  0.05  
  (‐2.60)    (1.49)   
London  ‐0.22 ***  0.01  
  (‐3.33)    (0.31)   
South West  ‐0.02   0.03  
  (‐0.30)    (0.95)   
Scotland  ‐0.1   ‐0.05  
  (‐1.37)    (‐0.89)   
Wales  ‐0.14 *  ‐0.08  
  (‐1.68)    (‐1.05)   
Number of Employees*100  ‐0.002   0  
  (‐0.69)    (‐0.47)   
Public sector  ‐0.12 *  ‐0.07 ** 
  (‐1.73)    (‐2.41)   
Workforce composition:         
Largest non‐managerial occupation (ref.: Professionals):     
Associate Professionals  0.06   ‐0.02  
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  (0.72)    (‐0.68)   
Administrative and Secretarial  ‐0.02   ‐0.02  
  (‐0.20)    (‐0.65)   
Skilled Trades  0.4 ***  0.06  
  (4.06)    (1.14)   
Caring, Leisure, Other Service  0.08   ‐0.02  
  (1.04)    (‐0.61)   
Sales and Customer Service  0.07   ‐0.04  
  (0.87)    (‐0.88)   
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives  0.37 ***  0  
  (3.28)    (‐0.04)   
Elementary  0.14   ‐0.05  
  (1.52)    (‐0.90)   
Percent female*100  ‐0.392 ***  0.069  
  (‐4.09)    (1.53)   
Contracts:         
Shift‐working (Ref: no)         
Yes  0.09 **  ‐0.02  
  (2.27)    (‐0.83)   
Don't know  ‐1.09 ***  ‐0.28 * 
  (‐7.37)    (‐1.95)   
Work organisation:         
Fully autonomous team‐working  0.04   ‐0.05 ** 
  (0.90)    (‐2.22)   
% core employees in teams  0   0.01 *** 
  (‐0.57)    (3.13)   
Functional flexibility (Ref.: no)         
Yes  0.08 **  ‐0.06 *** 
  (2.26)    (‐3.09)   
Don't know  ‐0.01   ‐0.22  
  (‐0.15)    (‐1.50)   
Number of incentive schemes  ‐0.03 *  0.01  
  (‐1.91)    (1.43)   
Job autonomy scale  0   0.01 *** 
  (‐0.58)    (3.20)   
HRM practices:         
Targets for absence  ‐0.04   ‐0.04 * 
  (‐0.86)    (‐1.90)   
Targets for employee job satisfaction  0.03   0.06 ** 
  (0.61)    (2.50)   
Targets missing  ‐0.02   0.15  
  (‐0.16)    (1.15)   
Sick pay (ref.: no entitlement above statutory)       
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Only managers > statutory  ‐0.01   0.01  
  (‐0.09)    (0.45)   
Only non‐managers > statutory  0.07   ‐0.2  
  (0.73)    (‐1.55)   
Both > statutory  ‐0.04   ‐0.01  
  (‐0.92)    (‐0.68)   
Don't know  ‐0.6 ***  0.04  
  (‐3.30)    (0.74)   
Health and safety training (Ref.: no)         
Yes  0.16 ***  0.02  
  (4.16)    (1.18)   
Don't know  0.46 ***  0.13  
  (3.86)    (1.54)   
Workplace performance:         
Performance additive scale  ‐0.04 ***  0  
  (‐3.40)    (0.63)   
Performance scale missing  ‐0.19 **  0.01  
  (‐2.28)    (0.23)   
Weakened by recession  0.04 **  ‐0.01  
  (2.55)    (‐0.83)   
Worker representation:         
Health and safety arrangements (Ref.: direct consultation)     
Joint Committee  0   ‐0.03  
  (0.07)    (‐0.93)   
Worker representatives  ‐0.08 **  ‐0.02  
  (‐2.01)    (‐0.69)   
Nothing  ‐0.1   ‐0.09  
  (‐0.43)    (‐1.03)   
Don't know  ‐0.05   ‐0.04  
  (‐0.36)    (‐0.20)   
Percent union membership (Ref.: 0%)       
1‐49%  0.14 **  0.01  
  (2.53)    (0.41)   
50%+  0.28 ***  0.01  
  (4.23)    (0.44)   
Don't know  0.05   0.03  
  (0.49)    (0.69)   
Constant  1.26 ***  1.96 *** 
  (7.46)    (23.32)   
2‐digit industry controls  Yes    Yes   
r‐squared  0.35   0.12  
Adjusted r‐squared  0.32   0.09  
N  2579   2584  
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Appendix 1: Survey Items on Risk and Control 
Health and Safety Items in WERS 2011 
The new questions: 
IWRKRISK*  
SHOW CARD I13  
Using a scale of 1 to 10 as shown on the card, where 1 means no risk at all, and 10 means a 
high degree of risk, how would you rate the potential health and safety risks faced by 
employees in this workplace?  
Range: 1..10  
INTERVIEWER: If the 
level of risk varies 
between different 
occupational groups, ask 
the respondent to rate the 
average across all 
groups. 1  
2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
No Risk At All  High Degree of Risk  
 
IWRKCONT*  
SHOW CARD I14  
Using a scale of 1 to 10 as shown on the card, where 1 means no control at all, and 10 
means a high degree of control, how would you rate the control that employees have over 
the health and safety risks that could affect them?  
Range: 1..10  
INTERVIEWER: If the 
level of control varies 
between different 
occupational groups, ask 
the respondent to rate the 
average across all 
groups. 1  
2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
No Control  
at All  
High Degree of Control  
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Appendix 2: Kernel Densities Showing The Log Transformation of the Risk and Control 
Ratings 
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Appendix 3: Mean and Standard Deviations For Independent Variables Used in 
Analysis 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
         
Dependent variables:         
Log risk rating  1.13  .550  0  2.303 
Risk rating  3.586  2.02  1  10 
Log control rating  2.071  .298  0  2.303 
Control rating  8.1948  1.660  1  10 
Respondent's characteristics:         
Female  .5393869  .499  0  1 
         
Responsible for health and safety  .7000388  .458  0  1 
Job title:         
Owner/General Manager  .456  .498  0  1 
Finance Manager  .039  .193  0  1 
Other  .011  .104  0  1 
Region:         
North East  .041  .198  0  1 
         
North West  .132  .338  0  1 
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Yorkshire and Humberside  .080  .271  0  1 
East Midlands  .062  .241  0  1 
West Midlands  .077  .266  0  1 
East of England  .087  .281  0  1 
         
South East  .130  .337  0  1 
South West  .084  .278  0  1 
Scotland  .104  .305  0  1 
Wales  .056  .230  0  1 
Number of employees at workplace  423  1151  5  20746 
         
Public sector  .302  .459  0  1 
Largest non‐managerial occupational group:         
Associate Professional  .115  .319  0  1 
Administrative/Secretarial  .134  .341  0  1 
Skilled Trade  .071  .2578  0  1 
Caring/Leisure/Other Service Occupations  .124  .330  0  1 
         
Sales and Customer Services  .127  .332  0  1 
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives  .087  .282  0  1 
Elementary  .125  .331  0  1 
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% female  52.200  28.109  0  100 
Shift work  .524  .499  0  1 
         
Shift work missing  .000  .020  0  1 
Fully autonomous teams  .454  .498  0  1 
% teamworking (categorical bands)  5.396  2.100  1  7 
Functional flexibility  .695  .461  0  1 
Functional flexibility missing  .018  .134  0  1 
         
Number of financial incentive schemes  1.162  1.488  0  7 
Job autonomy scale  7.879  2.462168  0  12 
Targets for absence  .498  .500  0  1 
Target for employee job satisfaction  .320  .467  0  1 
Targets missing  .003  .056  0  1 
         
Sick pay > statutory requirements:         
Nobody  .229  .420  0  1 
         
Managers only  .070  .256  0  1 
Core non‐managerial employees only  .016  .125  0  1 
Both managers and non‐managers  .686  .464  0  1 
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Health and safety training:         
Yes  .697  .459  0  1 
         
Don't know  .005  .074  0  1 
Workplace performance additive scale  4.545  2.345  0  9 
Workplace performance missing  .121  .326  0  1 
Workplace weakened by recession (categorical)  2.460  1.104  1  5 
Discusses implications of change with 
employees first (categorical)  4.041  .926  1  5 
         
Unions help improve performance (categorical)  3.043  .993  1  5 
Rather consult directly with employees than 
with unions (categorical)  3.739  1.159  1  5 
Attitudes missing  .012  .109  0  1 
Union density:         
1‐49%  .2673652  .4426704  0  1 
50‐100%  .236  .424  0  1 
         
Don't know  .050  .218  0  1 
What management normally does with unions 
with respect to health and safety:         
Negotiates  .069  .253  0  1 
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Consults  .299  .456  0  1 
Informs  .094  .292  0  1 
Does nothing  .094  .291  0  1 
         
Arrangements for health and safety matters:         
Joint committee  .367  .482  0  1 
Worker representatives  .208  .406  0  1 
No consultation  .009  .094  0  1 
Don't know  .006  .079  0  1 
Single digit industry:         
Electrical gas and water  .021  .143  0  1 
Construction  .037  .190  0  1 
Wholesale and Retail  .107  .309  0  1 
Hotels and restaurants  .062  .242  0  1 
Transport and Communication  .060  .237  0  1 
Financial Services  .018  .133  0  1 
Other business services  .134  .341  0  1 
Public administration  .085  .280  0  1 
Education  .130  .336  0  1 
Health  .159  .365  0  1 
Other community services  .090  .286  0  1 
